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Abstract:-A sensor network is confident of a 
large number of sensor nodes Sensor nodes are 
small, low-cost, low-power devices that have 
following performance communicate on short 
distances sense environmental data perform limited 
data processing The network usually also contains 
“sink” node which connects it to the outside world. 
Advances in technology introduce new application 
areas for sensor networks. Foreseeable wide 
deployment of mission critical sensor networks 
creates concerns on security issues. Security of 
large scale slowly deployed and infrastructure-less 
wireless networks of resource limited sensor nodes 
requires efficient key distribution and management 
mechanisms. We consider distributed and 
hierarchical wireless sensor networks where unjust, 
multicast and broadcast type of communications 
can take place. We evaluate deterministic, 
probabilistic and hybrid type of key pre-
distribution and dynamic key generation algorithms 
for distributing combination and network-wise 
keys. 
Keywords: Wireless sensor networks, security, key 
management, network scalability, secure 
connectivity coverage. 
 
Introduction:- 
Sensors are inexpensive, low-power devices which 
have limited resources [Akyildiz et al. 2002]. They 
are small in size, and have wireless communication 
capacity within short distances. A sensor node 
typically contains a power unit, a belive unit, a 
processing unit, a storage unit, and a wireless 
transmitter / receiver. A wireless sensor network 
(WSN) is composed of large number of sensor 
nodes with limited power, computation, storage 
and communication capabilities. Environ-ments, 
where sensor nodes are deployed, can be composed 
(comparable as home, office, warehouse, forest, 
etc.) or uncontrolled (such as hostile or horm areas, 
toxic regions, etc.). If the environment is known 
and under control, deployment may be achieved 
manually to establish an framework. However, 
manual deployments become infeasible or even 
impossible as the number of the nodes increases. If 
the environment is uncontrolled or the WSN is very 
large, deployment has to be per-formed by 
randomly scattering the sensor nodes to destination 
area. It may be possible to provide denser sensor 
deployment at specific spots, but exact positions of 
the sensor nodes can not be controlled. Thus, 
network topology can not be known precisely prior 
to deployment. Although topology information can 
be obtained by using mobile sensor nodes and self-
deployment protocols as proposed in [Wang et al. 
2004] and [Zou and Chakrabarty 2003], this may 
not be possible for a large scale WSN. Security in 
WSN has six challenges: (i) wireless nature of 
communication, (ii)resource limitation on sensor 
nodes, (iii) very large and dense WSN, (iv) lack of 
fixed infrastructure, (v) unknown network topology 
prior to deployment, (vi) high risk of physical 
attacks to unattended sensors. Moreover, in some 
deployment scenarios sensor nodes need to operate 
under adversarial condition. Security solutions for 
such applications depend on existence of strong 
and efficient key distribution mechanisms. It is 
infeasible, or even impossible in uncontrolled 
environments, to visit large number of sensor 
nodes, and change their configuration. Moreover, 
use of a single shared key in whole WSN is not a 
good idea because an adversary can easily obtain 
the key. Thus, sensor nodes have to adapt their 
environments, and establish a secure network by: 
(i) using pre-distributed keys or keying materials, 
(ii) exchanging information with their immediate 
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neighbors, or (iii) exchanging in-formation with 
computationally robust nodes. Although there are 
ongoing works [Malan et al. 2004; Gaubatz et al. 
2004; Huang et al. 2003] to customize public key 
cryptography and elliptic key cryptography for 
low-power devices, such approaches are still 
considered as costly due to high processing 
requirements. Key distribution and management 
problem in WSN is difficult one, and requires new 
approaches. Motivation of this paper is to evaluate 
the key distribution solutions. Depending on 
application types, it is possible to discuss: (i) 
network architectures such as distributed or 
hierarchical, (ii) communication styles such as pair-
wise (unicast), group-wise (multicast) or network-
wise (broadcast), (iii) security requirements such as 
authentication, confidentiality or integrity, and (iv) 
keying requirements such as pre-distributed or 
dynamically generated pair-wise, group-wise or 
network-wise keys. In this paper, we provide a 
comparative survey, and taxonomy of solutions. It 
may not be always possible to give strict 
quantitative comparisons; however, there are 
certain metrics, as described in the next section, 
that can be used to evaluate the solutions. 
Key Management Goals: 
 The protocol must establish a key between 
all sensor nodes that must exchange data 
securely  
 Node addition / deletion should be 
supported 
 It should work in undefined deployment 
environment 
 Unauthorized nodes should not be allowed 
to establish communication with network 
nodes 
Key Management Problem: 
 
 
 
 Trusted-server schemes 
 Finding trusted servers is difficult 
 Public-key schemes 
 Expensive and infeasible for 
sensors 
 Key pre-distribution schemes 
Key Pre-distribution 
 Loading Keys into sensor nodes prior to 
deployment 
 Two nodes find a common key between 
them after deployment 
 Challenges 
 Memory/Energy efficiency 
 Security: nodes can be 
compromised 
 Scalability: new nodes might be 
added later 
Straight Forward Approach: 
 Single mission key is obviously 
unacceptable 
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 Pairwise private key sharing between 
every two nodes is impractical because of 
the following reasons: 
 it requires pre-distribution and 
storage of n-1 keys in each node 
which is n(n-1)/2 per WSN 
 most of the keys would be 
unusable since direct 
communication is possible only 
in the nodes neighborhood 
 addition / deletion of the node 
and re-keying are complex 
Basic Probabilistic Approach: 
 Proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor  
 Relies on probabilistic key sharing among 
nodes of WSN 
 Uses simple shared-key discovery 
protocol for key distribution, revocation 
and node re-keying  
 Three phases are involved: key pre-
distribution, shared-key discovery, path-
key establishment 
Key Pre-distribution 
 
 
Shared-key Discovery:- 
 Takes place during initialization phase 
after WSN deployment. Each node 
discovers its neighbor in communication 
range with which it shares at least one key 
 Nodes can exchange IDs of keys that they 
poses and in this way discover a common 
key  
 A more secure approach would involve 
broadcasting a  challenge for each key in 
the key ring such that each challenge is 
encrypted with some particular key. The 
decryption of a challenge is possible only 
if a shared key exists 
Path-key Establishment:- 
• During the path-key establishment phase 
path-keys are assigned to selected pairs of 
sensor nodes that are within 
communication range of each other, but 
do not share a key 
 Find secure path by using flooding method
 
Fig:Key Assignment for all the key pools 
 Limit the lifetime of the flooding 
message to three hops to reduce 
flooding overhead 
 Share random key K by using secure path  
Local Connectivity:- 
 With 100 keys, location management 
improves local connectivity from 0.095 to 
0.687 
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fig:Local connectivity: Probability of sharing atleast one key 
between two neighbouring nodes. 
Conclusion:- 
Robust security mechanisms are vital to the wide 
acceptance and use of senor networks for many 
applications Security in WSN is quite different 
from traditio(wired) network security Various 
peculiarities of WSN make the development of 
good key scheme a challenging task We have 
discussed several approaches to key management 
in WSN. 
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